Ontological status of the archetypal image by Meredith, Ted Jordan
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1973 
Ontological status of the archetypal image 
Ted Jordan Meredith 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Meredith, Ted Jordan, "Ontological status of the archetypal image" (1973). Graduate Student Theses, 
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5732. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5732 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OP THE 
ARCHETYPAL IMAGE
• By-
Ted J. Meredith
B.A., University of Montana, 1971
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of •
Master of Arts
UNIVERSITY OP MONTANA
1973
Approved by:
/{{J rv v iT '
Chairman,. Board »of Examiners'
---
14— --------------radu^t e^S cho o
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CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND INTENT
Transcendental philosophies, that is philosophies 
which posit an a priori structuring of consciousness such 
that there are patterned, dispositions of cognition, arise 
out of the difficulties involved with various analyses of 
the world. An analysis of a particular problem may yield 
certain results while another analysis will yield different, 
perhaps conflicting, results; yet both analyses will be 
self-justifying, coincide with the facts, or appear to have 
inner consistency. This conflict calls into question the 
ultimate validity of both analyses and militates against the 
possibility of even approaching an adequate or valid under­
standing of the world. Transcendental philosophy seeks to 
analyze the problems at a deeper level which will overcome 
these difficulties. It attempts to do this, in part, by 
analyzing the analysis. This is done by inquiry into the 
presuppositions of the analyses and specifying the horizons 
of their operations. Or in terms of cognition in general, it 
attempts to delimit horizons of cognition by an inquiry into 
its structuring agents. But transcendental philosophy always 
fails, itself in that an inquiry into the structuring agents 
is always and ineluctably through those same agents which
1
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finally elude analysis. Further, while transcendental 
philosophy uncovers and delimits possibilities, it is in­
capable of ascertaining the importance of any one of the 
possibilities. Nothing announces itself as meaningful in the 
equally arbitrary possibilities.
As a philosophical position, transcendental philosophy 
may be ultimately untenable, but, as a mode of analysis, it 
has been used fruitfully to clarify naive argument and to 
guide discussion into productive areas. Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, for example, which deals with the structure arid 
status of man's existence and with the question of Being, 
grew in part out of the background of Husserl's transcendental 
phenomenology. The analysis is in terms of man's existential 
horizons. Heidegger's use of transcendental phenomenology in 
Being and Time is highly sophisticated and reflects this 
extensive background. This sophistication allows an articu­
late expression of his ideas. The "philosophy-psychology" of 
C. G. Jung, on the other hand, emerges from a background of 
biology and Freudian psychology, and grows into a sort of 
transcendental philosophy out of his experiences with 
patients and his studies of cultures and mythologies. His 
findings of universal areas of meaning and their imagery as 
revealed in dreams, mythology, and in ongoing experiencing 
led him to posit the archetypes as transcendental factors. 
Jung's chief goal was not a philosophical system, but rather 
a methodology for helping patients. He considered his
methodology important for the ’’normal" as well as the sick." 
Because of his concern with therapeutic methodology, his 
"philosophy" consequently suffers. It is unsophisticated 
and troubled by a lack of an adequate terminology which 
would properly express his ideas. It is, on the other hand, 
innovative and speaks to central issues which are neglected 
by more sophisticated philosophies. In this sense, the 
"philosophy" of C. G. Jung is important to the philosophic 
tradition.
It is the intent of this paper to attend to selected 
areas of Jung’s "philosophy" which are of ontological import 
and to precision them in terms of Heidegger’s transcendental 
ontology as set forth in Being and Time. The precisioning 
will be toward establishing the ontological status of arche­
typal regions which will in turn speak to areas of diffi­
culty or impasse in traditional transcendental approaches. 
The paper is not intended to be a critique of Being and Time 
or of Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole; rather Being and 
Time is used as a point of departure and reference to pre­
cision an important ontological area.
CHAPTER II
THE ARCHETYPAL IMAGE
Jung calls transcendental factors archetypes. The 
archetypes, according to Jung, are motifs which arrange the 
functioning of the psyche into patterns but are not directly 
observable. They are a priori off inborn forms of percep­
tion and apprehension which are necessary olP a priori deter-
1minants of all psychic processes. Whenever one observes
uniform and regularly recurring modes of apprehension, he is
2dealing with an archetype. Anxiety and the desire to belong
are such universal modes. The existentials explicated in
Being and Time are in this sense archetypes. Jung states:
Just as we have been compelled to postulate the concept 
of an instinct deteraining or regulating our conscious 
actions, so, in order to account for the uniformity and 
regularity of our perceptions, we must have recourse to 
the correlated concept of a factor determining the mode 
of apprehension. It is the factor which I call the 
archetype or primordial image. The primordial image 
might suitably be described as the instinct1s percep­
tion of itself t or as the self-portrait of the instinct, 
m  exactly t!he same way as consciousness is an inward 
perception of the objective life-process.3
C. G. Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche; 
in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, ed. by Sir Herbert 
Read, trans. by R. i’« C. Hull, Vjljli , 133•
2Ibid.t pp. 137-138.
3Ibid., pp. 136-137.
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Jung’s distinction between instinct and archetype is
unclear. At times the definition of archetype seems to
include instinct within it; at other times a separation is
emphasized in which instincts institute fairly specific
actions and archetypes institute an apprehension of those
acts and of the relationship with the world in general. In
both cases, however, archetypes function to establish an
understanding of the world; that is, their functioning is
toward meaning*
Archetypes as transcendental motifs reflect what is
constant and meaningful in the world. One is always faced
with his own death, for example, recognition of which
affects man's relationship with himself and the world. The
totality of archetypes Jung calls the collective uncon- 
4scious. The collective unconscious is not to be confused 
with the personal unconscious., The latter consists of con­
tents acquired from personal experience but.later falling 
below the threshold of consciousness. The former is uncon­
scious in the sense that its contents were never conscious 
but are universally present as structural motifs for and 
prior to all cognition.
Although the concept of the unconscious is not gener­
ally part of the working terminology of transcendental
4C. G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Uncon-
' 6
philosophy, the theme is ubiquitous and the term itself is
'not entirely foreign. Husserl states, for example,
While the corresponding intentionality is being 
executed, while it is flowing in this manner as an 
Objectivatingly productive living, it is "uncon­
scious"— that is to say: it makes thematic, but it
itself is, for that very reason and as a matter of 
essential necessity, non-thematic.5
The archetypes are thematizing forces, but, insofar as an
inquiry into them is done in their theme, their thematizing
is never fully disclosed. The archetypes as such remain
unconscious in the sense that they are never fully called
into consciousness.
As fundamental structuring forces, archetypes comprise 
the totality of possibilities for human experiencing and 
relatedness to the world. The totality of archetypes and the 
totality of what is possible for mam are coextensive by defi­
nition. The collective unconscious itself is the horizon of 
all horizons.
Jung distinguishes between archetype and archetypal 
image. The former is not directly observable and can only 
be recognized in archetypal images which are the manifest 
product of the archetypes. These archetypal images may vary 
in the individuals and cultures in which they are manifest, 
but there are universal aspects of these archetypal images 
which are grounded in the archetypes as such. Ancient Greece,
5Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, 
trans. by Dorion Cairns, p. 34.
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for example, had seafaring capabilities to relatively distant 
lands while in Mesopotamia distant forests provided the 
sought after boon, yet both the Odyssey and the Gilgamesh 
Epic center around the theme of the journey to distant unknown 
regions. Archetypes do not refer to inherited ideas, but 
rather to inherited modes of psychic functioning which have 
the potential to become actualized as archetypal images in 
accordance with the individual’s frame of reference and with 
respect to ongoing external reality. Jung states that arch- 
types are
i
. . . forms without content, representing merely the 
possibilities of a certain type of perception and 
action. When a situation occurs which corresponds to 
a certain archetype, that archetype becomes activated.6
Because Jung’s concern is primarily finding a thera­
peutic methodology (though a relatively loose one) through 
which a viable existence can be achieved, his concern is 
initially psychology and not ontology. Though through his 
investigations he finds that ontology (though he does not 
call it that) is central to his psychology, he nevertheless 
writes in terms of his original goal. He finds patterns of 
behavior which are universal in man and seem to be the key to 
achieving a viable existence insofar as his findings with 
patients indicate these dispositions must be recognized and 
appropriated. If they are not appropriated, their force is
6Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious,
P- 43*
such that they will make themselves manifest in degenerate 
forms and seemingly unexplainable preoccupations which will 
block the clear appropriation of other archetypes and mili­
tate against a viable existence. This is exampled when the 
wilderness is viewed as a threat to society and culture that 
must be controlled and destroyed rather than preserved as a 
region which articulates a freedom and openness toward the 
world and ourselves.
A cursory view of his writings would seem to indicate 
their basis is an iritersubjectivity or some form of psych­
ologism. This is not the case. While seldom explicitly 
expressed, implicit throughout his writings is the 'acknowl­
edgment that the world is the final objective ground. The 
collective unconscious mirrors the world and carries its 
message. Jung;
No, the collective unconscious is anything "but an 
incapsulated personal system; it is sheer objectivity, 
as wide as the world and open to all the world* There 
I am the object of every subject, in complete reversal 
of my ordinary consciousness, where I am always the 
subject that has an object. There I am utterly one 
with the world, so much a part of it that I forget all 
too easily who I really am. "Lost in oneself" is a 
good way ,.of describing this state. But the self is the 
world, if only a consciousness could see it. That is 
why we must know who we are.7
Jung's assertion that the world is the objective ground for
the archetypes and human experiencing arises in part from
the notion of evolution. Dispositions toward certain
^Ibid., p. 22,
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actions and modes of perception arise in the evolutionary 
process through interaction with the world. Life itself 
emerged from the world. Further, perception of the world is 
not arbitrary and subject to any variation at will, but 
rather delimited by the world itself. One cannot walk 
through walls.
What follows is a partial summary of certain aspects
of Heidegger’s existential analysis as set forth in Being and
Time. It will provide the necessary conceptual tools for an
inquiry into archetypal regions. In Being and Time Heidegger
distinguishes between two types of inquiry. Ontical inquiry
is an inquiry into things and is the characteristic inquiry
of the sciences. Ontological inquiry is concerned with
8meaning and the question of Being. While ontical inquiry 
deals with the categorization of entities, ontological inquiry 
deals with the existentials of Being as the terms of its 
inquiry. Being,is not an entity, a collection of entities, 
or the1 most' general category of entities, but existence 
itself. Dasein, literally ’’being there,” is the ontological 
naming of what is ontically called man. What is revealed in 
ontical inquiry is factual. In ontological inquiry what is 
revealed is factical. What is ja£/issue in Being and Time is 
the question of the meaning of Being. However, it will be 
shown that the issue of meaning is inadequately dealt with in
8Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, p.
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Being and Time and that something like archetypal regions are 
necessary in order to adequately deal with it as an existen­
tial force. The existential analysis of Dasein is fundamen­
tal insofar as it is concerned with all the ways in which 
Casein can exist and therefore encompasses all other forms 
of inquiry, The existential totality constitutes the final 
horizon of Dasein.
An aspect of Dasein*s faeticity is Being-in-the-world. 
Dasein finds itself already in a world.
With equal primordiality Dasein also possesses— as 
constitutive for its Understanding of existence— an 
understanding of the Being of all entities of a 
character other than its own.9
(The world shows itself ontically in that its entities are
subject to inquiry and ontologically in that the world is
determinative‘for Dasein*s understanding of its Being. To
Be for Dasein is to Be-in-the-world. The primary mode in
which Dasein relates to the world is to use it. One opens a
door, hammers something, and eats something before he thinks
1 0of thinking about its "nature" or "objective" properties.
This mode of relatedness of things Heidegger calls readiness- 
to-hand. Describing the world in terms of things independent 
of their function is thus a derivative mode and is character­
istically the sole subject of scientific analysis. This
% b i d . , p. 34-.
^Ibid. , p. 9 6.
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11mode of relating Heidegger calls the present-at-hand.
In each case, Dasein is at issue for itself. What
Dasein does and what happens to Dasein matters to Dasein.
"That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very
12Being is m  each case mine."
And because Dasein is in each case its own possibility, 
it can, in its very Being, "choose'’ itself and win 
itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; 
or only "seem" to do so.13
Dasein can be authentic and inauthentic. Authentically
eigentlich Dasein can make its possibilities its own eigen
in awareness of its own existence. Inauthentically Dasein is
unaware of itself, or that is to say aware of itself only as
others see it. The who of Dasein is primarily encountered as
the they.
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] 
take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about litera­
ture and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink 
back from the "great mass" as they shrink back; we 
find "shocking" what they find shocking. The "they," 
which is nothing definite, and which we all are, though 
not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of every­
dayness.
No one is responsible for the they, and yet everyone conforms
to it.
Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. 
Overnight, everything that is primoridal gets glossed 
over as something that has long been known. Every­
thing gained by a struggle becomes just something to
12Ibid., p. 67.
^^Ibid., p. 68. 
U Ibid. , p. 164.
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be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This 
care of averageness reveals in turn an essential 
tendency of Dasein which we call "leveling down" 
[Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being.15
Nothing is at issue and nothing is appropriated as one's own
to face.
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which 
we distinguish from the authentic Self-—-that is, of 
the Self that has been taken hold of in its own way 
[eigens ergriffenenj.16
In this state of everydayness Dasein conceals itself.
Dasein is involved in the ready-to-hand of the world
and content operating within the everyday expectations of
the day. But Dasein is capable of experiencing anxiety
[Angst]* Dasein may suddenly feel uncomfortable and strange
as if it did not quite belong, as if Something Were not
quite right. It is not fear of something. Nothing is
troubling Dasein. But the nothing is telling. Dasein feels
17as if it is not at home m  its world. In the they-world, 
Dasein is at home in its expectations. But; if Dasein feels 
no longer at home, at homeness becomes an issue and, more­
over, Dasein's own Being becomes an issue. Dasein cares 
about what is meaningful, about what is at issue for itself,
about its potentiality-for-Being. Care is the ontological
18condition for Being-free for authenticity.
15Ibid., p. 165.
16Ibid., p. 167.
1^Ibid. , p. 233.
18Ibid.* p. 237.
13
In the Heideggerian analysis, the world shows itself
in terms of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand.
Spatiality of the present-at-hand is in terms of ontic
measured space. But Dasein, fundamentally, does not live in
measured space but rather the spatiality of the ready-to-
hand. Heidegger:
The "above” is what is "on the ceiling*?; the ’’below" 
is what is "on the flopr"; the "behind" is what is 
"at the door"; all "wheres" are discovered and circum­
spect ively interpreted as we go on our ways in every­
day dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued 
by the observational measurement of space.19
The spatiality of ready-to-hand entities are not encountered
as isolated but in spatial contexts with other entities.
This "whither" which makes it possible for equipment 
to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively 
keep in view ahead of us in our concemful dealings, 
we call the region.20
The readiness-to-hand of an entity establishes its location
and function in terms of the totality of the ready-to-hand
in the region. As an example Heidegger speaks of the sun
. . . whose light and warmth are in everyday use, has 
its own places— sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight; 
these are discovered in circumspection and treated 
distinctively in terms of changes in the usability of 
what the sun bestows.21
The places of the sun indicate regions of use.
The house has its sunny side and its shady side; the 
way it is divided up into ’’rooms" is oriented toward
19Ibid.t p. 137.
20Ibid., p. 136.
21Ibid.t p. 137.
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these, and so is the "arrangement" within them, 
according to their character as equipment.22
Heidegger explicates region in terms of the use of 
the ready-to-hand, but in his analysis of region (at least 
in Being and Time) he glosses over an aspect of region which 
is of fundamental ontological importance. He does allude to 
it although he treats it just as another example of the 
regionality of the ready-to-hand. Speaking still in terms 
of the regions indicated by the positioning of the sun, he 
says,
Churches and graves, for instance, are laid out 
according to the rising and the setting of the sun—  
the regions of life and death, which are determina­
tive for Dasein itself with regard to its ownmost 
possibilities of Being in the world.23
The regions in this example are different from those of
previous examples. In previous examples regions were shown
to be contexts of usability for the ready-to-hand: it is
difficult to do hard labor at midday when the sun is at its
hottest; plants that require much sunlight must be oriented
to receive maximum sunlight throughout the day; certain rooms
of the house are cooler or warmer than others due to their
exposure to the sun. The regions of the ready-to-hand are,
so to speak, navigational; they are meaningful in terms of
keeping cooler or being a good gardener, but they are not
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
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ontologically decisive, or only indirectly so, for Dasein.
The death of a tomato plant is not decisive for Dasein.
Death is. The regionality of the ready-to-hand is not 
intrinsically meaningful to Dasein. It is meaningful only 
in the context of what is decisive for Dasein.
The orientation of churches and graves according to 
the rising and the'setting of the sun is neither fully 
ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand. Dasein does not use the 
orientation of churches and graves hut rather is called into 
a selfsame orientation which attunes itself to the regions 
of life and death— an intrinsically meaningful attunement 
which is decisive for Dasein. This region does not reveal 
itself to Dasein as something td he used, hut as something 
to he listened to, as somethirig .which hears a decisive 
message. Neither is this sort of region present-at-hand.
An ontic measurement of the orientation would not reveal its 
significance for Dasein. Indeed, it is very close to Dasein. 
This ontologically decisive region is what Jung calls an 
archetypal image.
It should he noted that in his later writings 
Heidegger seldom deals with the ready-to-hand and present- 
at-hand, but turns instead, more towards what has here been 
called archetypal regions. The deficiencies in Being, and . 
Time, however, point to the deficiencies inherent in tran­
scendental philosophies as a whole. They ultimately occlude 
the very thing which would make their enterprise vital—
16
meaning. The sources and grounding of meaning are covered 
over and remain hidden in the navigational possibilities 
which are explicated. Thus in traditional transcendental 
analysis the world becomes nihilated and Dasein's Self is 
preempted.
The region indicated by the orientation of churches 
and graves is determinative for Dasein. The orientation is 
not merely an agreed upon spatiality created by Dasein to 
stand for some thing which it finds important, but rather 
the orientation is a response by Dasein to a region of con­
texts -which show themselves as holding importance for Dasein. 
The orientation is in terms of the region circumscribed by 
the rising and setting of the sun, a region which is of 
ontological import for Dasein, which Dasein did not create 
with the. ready-to-rhand, and which Dasein encounters in the 
world and responds toward in the building of its churches 
and the burying of its dead.
.•Just as the "whither" of the ready-to-hand allows for 
the belonging of the ready-to-hand in such a way that it 
makes possible for Dasein a circumspective and projective 
involvement in regional possibilities, so too archetypal 
regions are constituted such that Dasein is involved circum- 
spectively and ahead of itself in ontologically articulate 
situations. Dasein’s world not only shows itself as equip­
ment for use (ready-to-hand) and objects for analysis 
(present-at-hand) but also as ontologically articulate for
Dasein. Dasein in this way is,not,only in a world, but in a 
world as belonging to it. Because the analysis of Dasein*s 
comportment toward the world in Being and Time is restricted 
to two modes, the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand, the 
importance of a comportment which is not primarily character­
ized by analyzing objects or use of the world is hidden or 
treated misleadingly. The regions of intrinsic meaning, such 
as death and its correlation with the sun, go unexplicated as 
such. Instead when they inevitably arise (in the analysis 
of death, for example), they are fit rather uncomfortably 
into the existing analytical framework. The analysis thus 
suffers in that it fails to fully ground Dasein in "lasting” 
regions which are not subject to ontical or utilitarian dis­
missal. And it suffers in that the status of the world is 
relegated to limiting horizons off which Dasein, so to speak, 
bounces in finding its way in the world, rather than as the 
source of meaning and grounding force of Dasein*s Being 
which Jung's archetypal analysis shows it to be. Jung's 
analysis recognizes the archetypal regions as the grounding 
force towards which Dasein must turn and the images of the 
world as directive toward that end. As a traditional 
phenomenological approach shows, the world provides naviga­
tional boundaries, but to think of the world merely in this 
way distorts the totality of what the world holds. Jung's 
archetypal approach shows the world to have a special signi­
ficance. It directs Dasein to its regions of meaning which
allow Dasein to attune itself to '’what matters" and so fully 
be itself. What is authentically Dasein's own is articulated 
in the world. Dasein and the world are bound in a belonging 
to Dasein’s Being. That is, what is ontologically decisive 
for Dasein and belongs to it as its own belongs also to the 
world.
Meaning is an existential. It is part of the facti- 
city of Dasein that meaning is a fundamental aspect of its 
Being. This is revealed not only in meaningful situations 
as in the regions of life and death, but also in meaningless­
ness. Meaninglessness matters to Dasein and reveals meaning 
as an existential concern of Dasein. Dasein does not merely 
create meaning in a meaningless world. Dasein is always 
already in a world in which meaning is an issue. The sepa­
ration of meaning from the world occurs only in isolated 
ontical analysis which excludes the ontological. In ontical 
analysis, if objects are analyzed as apart from Dasein, then 
of course meaning does not appear, for meaning shows itself 
only when it resonates that which is able to receive meaning—  
Dasein. In ontological analysis, there is no subject-object
'i .
schism as such and thus meaning is revealed as belonging at 
the same time to the world and to Dasein. Heidegger’s 
analysis in Being and Time is accurate in that it shows that 
meaning belongs at the same time to the world and to Dasein, 
but it is misleading in that it deals with meaning from a 
navigational standpoint and fails to disclose fully the
19
intrinsic meaning of archetypal regions which ground Dasein 
simultaneously in itself and the world and upon which navi­
gational meaning is ultimately dependent for its status as 
meaningful.
Archetypal images are not only static referents— ■ 
sunrise as region of birth, sunset as region of death— but 
also refer to existential regions of involvement and move­
ment among and through regions which tie together the existen- 
tialia of Dasein. An aspect of the image of the sun is that 
of bringing to light and making present. In its region of 
day, it brings illumination and presence to the things of 
the world. The journey of the sun across the sky connects 
and relates the regions of sunrise and sunset— the regions 
of birth and death— and corresponds to Dasein's journey 
whose Being in its region of day is the making present of 
Being. The coming into Being of Dasein and the termination 
of Dasein’s existence are tied together through its journey.
Without the archetypes, the bearers of intrinsic 
meaning, navigational1events would be isolated, fragmented, 
and void of meaning. Since they are not in themselves mean­
ingful, they would exist as empty events towards nothing.
But meaning is an existential, and the navigational events 
are toward the intrinsically meaningful which reaches back 
to embrace and unify them and to infuse them with the meaning 
of the regions. Thus, the "Da-Sein" is more than a mere 
series of things and events occurring in the space between
20
the horizons of birth and death; it is authentically a 
weaving of archetypes which ties together and unifies 
"Da-Sein" meaningfully.
Archetypal images are often rejected, dismissed, or 
ignored. Jung deals with this issue in terms of the one­
sidedness of the conscious and the repression of the con-, i
tents of the unconscious. Such an approach fuiictions well 
therapeutically, but in tenns of a rigorous ontology it falls 
short in that it tends to focus on the consciousness of man 
and in so doing does not adequately deal with the world as 
the "objectivating" source of these images. It is necessary, 
therefore, to turn to Heidegger’s analysis of everydayness 
and death which is more fully;capable of handling the onto­
logical status of the world and Dasein's relation to it.
In everydayness, the they passes off archetypal images 
as something that everyone knows anyway. The they grants 
that sunrise sometimes symbolizes birth and because the they 
"understands" what sunrise means it can dismiss it as some­
thing it already knows and thus close itself off from the 
possibility of entering the region. The they acknowledges 
that sunset sometimes symbolizes death and in doing so takes 
an "objective" view which distances itself from what is 
decisive for it. The they protects Dasein from making the 
region its own. Archetypal images may be rejected as being 
meaningless to ontical analysis (of the present-at-hand) 
and as irrelevant to everyday functioning (the ready-to-hand).
21
Archetypal regions may be concealed by an analysis "in favor" 
of these regions if the analyst operated only from the dis­
tance of analysis and fails himself to enter into the regions 
of concern and make them his own. Archetypal images may be 
rejected on the grounds that their meaning is only ascribed 
secondarily and only after what is at issue is revealed pre­
viously by some analysis. But Dasein does not first of all 
analyze the world; rather it first inhabits it and moves in
and through its regions. The analysis is dependent upon and
grounded in these regions and not vice versa. Dasein is
struck with and taken into an involvement with a sunset be­
fore it analyzes it. Archetypal regions resonate and are 
somehow meaningful for Dasein before it is at all clear or 
articulate what is meant. But the regions, too, seem to 
lead into and call for articulation. As the sun slips past 
the horizon and the world begins to darken, Dasein may be 
turned toward its own nightfall and to circumspective con­
cern toward what is at issue for itself. The they may 
reject these regions, as for example when Dasein flees from 
a facing of its death into the more comfortable oblivion of 
everydayness, but authentically these regions involve Dasein 
in articulating and making its own what it is. The regions 
may be rejected but if appropriated openly their numinosity 
draws Dasein into deeper involvements with the region and 
with itself. The region of sunset calls circumspectively in- 
to question the nature of the journey just completed and
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correspondingly calls into question each Dasein in the midst 
of its own journey between its horizons of birth and deatho 
The they appropriated the journey as that which hap­
pens between birth and death. Calling that space "journey" 
seems a bit odd to the they. The space between birth and 
death is more generally called one's life. While life may 
at times be a numinous term, it is more often a passive cate­
gory which describes oneself without specifically involving 
oneself. Life is the space between birth and death which 
describes a status of all sentient beings and which also 
therefore applies to the status of oneself. As one's life, 
the space between the horizons of birth and death is rele­
gated to the they. Heidegger speaks of the leveled down 
in-between when he says:
Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch "of life"—  
one which is somehow present-at-hand— with the phases 
of its momentary actualities. It stretches itself 
along in such a way that its own Being is constituted 
in advance as a stretching-along.24
Thus Dasein authentically is not involved isolatedly with 
things and events but with the totality of the "in-between" 
which is characterized in journey. In neglecting the arche­
typal regions, the they attempts to operate in terms of the 
navigational. Things and events lack coherence, meaning 
disappears, and "Da-Sein" becomes the empty "in-between" of 
birth and death. A journey is not passive and empty, but
2^Ibid., p. 426.
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implies commitment. A journey is an undertaking. Life as 
space does not readily admit' its final horizon. In journey 
there is recognition of the existential movement of the 
joumeyer, Dasein, toward the region of death. Appropriated 
as journey, Dasein makes its venture its own in recognition 
of itself.
Heidegger's analysis shows that death plays a decisive 
role in Dasein's existence. Not only is it decisive in that 
death is, the end of Dasein's existence and therefore is hori­
zontal for Dasein, but it may be decisive in that it can 
function radically to alter Dasein's existence in its Being- 
in-the-world. Death is appropriated by the they as that 
which happens to one sometime— everybody dies. But in making 
death its own, that is, appropriating death authentically, 
Dasein not only authenticates this "phase" of its own exist­
ence but is turned toward the authenticity of its Being-in- 
the-world as a whole— it is this existential turning toward 
the totality of its ownmost possibilities which makes death 
a decisive factor in Dasein's existence. Heideggers
Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of 
the possible impossibility of It's existence. Anxiety 
is anxious about the potentiality-for-Being of the 
entity so destined [des so bestimmten Seienden], and 
in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility. 
Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and it 
allows it, in this individualization of itself, to be­
come certain of the totality of its potentiality-for- 
Being. 25
25Ibido, p. 310.
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The possibility of its own non-being focuses Dasein*s concern 
toward, the question of Being and it turns Dasein toward its 
ownmost possibilities in which it is free to make itself] its 
own.
Death thus frees Dasein for itself. The decisive and 
pervasive regional "where” for Dasein freed for itself is "on 
the journey." Dasein is always between the horizons of birth 
and death; authentically appropriated, Dasein is always and 
•everywhere "on the journey." Turned toward death, Dasein is 
faced with its ownmost possibilities for Being. And moreover 
it is faced with the question "Which of these possibilities 
matter in the face of the final horizon?" First and fore­
most , the journey matters. The appropriation of the journey 
as one's own, turning towards one's possibilities, makes 
possible an authentic asking of the question "What matters?" 
And it is along this journey that what matters announces 
itself. That is, what matters "matters" in the face of 
death— -the face which the journey is always and ineluctably 
turned toward.
Heidegger's analysis pointedly shows that making 
death one's own turns Dasein toward its ownmost possibilities 
of Being and unifies "Da-Sein" by relating it to its possi­
bilities. But not all possibilities matter "in the end," 
and it is a failing of the analysis that it is not able to 
deal specifically with "what matters." Dasein can only be 
fully unified, related, and meaningful when it takes up with
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its archetypal possibilities specifically. Heidegger's 
analysis lacks a concept, which would designate a movement 
of appropriation that is open to all possibilities and yet 
is particularly attuned and receptive to the specific arche­
typal possibilities which are ontologically decisive. The 
journey, properly'understood, is such an ontological move­
ment and comportment and fulfills this lack.
The end of the journey is death. Death is the final 
horizon for Dasein and makes possible the journey itself.
But if the end of the journey is death, is this also its 
goal? In one sense it is— the goal is the culmination of the 
journey— thus death is journey's goal. But while decisively 
important, this goal does not belong just to the journey but 
to all the possibilities of Dasein. It is legitimate, then, 
to ask what differentiates journey as an existential, that 
is, to ask what is the journey's goal which it admits to in 
its own involvement toward it; and similarly to inquire into 
the nature of its path. That is, what characterizes Dasein 
which is on the journey, and where does Dasein go on its way 
toward death?
The appropriation of the journey as one's own which 
makes possible an authentic asking of the question "What 
matters?" involves a capability of Dasein which is called 
understanding. The viability of the question "What matters?" 
is dependent upon the possibility of an articulate compre­
hension of what is at issue and a concernful openness to
that which speaks to "what matters." The constitution of
understanding is thus significant to Dasein, who is on the
journey. Heidegger provides the basis for the analysis?
If the term "understanding" is taken in a way which 
is primordially existential, it means to be projecting 
towards a potentially-for-Being for the saEe of which"" 
any Pas'eTn exists. "
Heidegger explicates the inauthentic and authentic
modes of understanding with respect to the three ecstases
of time; past, present, and future. In the authentic’future
characterized by anticipation, Dasein moves toward its Self
in terms of coming to meet its ownmost possibilities.
Inauthentically future is characterized by expecting in
which Dasein waits for possibilities in terms of the daily
activity with which it is concerned in everydayness. Of the
authentic present characterized by the "moment of vision,"
Heidegger says it "permits us _to encounter for the first
time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present- 
27at-hand." The inauthentic present is characterized by 
"making present" in which Dasein is merely involved in its 
everyday activities. The authentic past is characterized by 
repetition in which Dasein makes its own what it already is 
and is toward its potentiality-for-Being in the context of 
what it already has been. Inauthentically past is a for­
getting, a backing away in the face of what Dasein
2^Ibid., p. 385.
2^Ibid., p. 388.
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existentially has been.
Throughout the analysis, what characterizes the 
inauthentic is an anonymous or vicarious involvement in the 
everyday activities with the ready-to-hand and the present- 
at-hand. Authenticity is characterized by a resoluteness 
and a making one’s own the possibilities of ready-to-hand 
and present-at-hand involvements. His characterization of 
the authentic present examples this point when he says of 
the "moment of vision" that it "permits us to encounter for
the first time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or
28present-at-hand."
Authenticity permits an encountering. But the force 
of the encountering permitted by authentic appropriation is 
not sufficiently characterized by navigational possibilities 
of the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand which Dasein 
makes it own, rather the existential force is the encounter 
with that which shows itself to Dasein as being intrinsi­
cally meaningful— archetypal regions. The archetypal regions 
are the final horizons of the "for the sake of which" towards 
which Dasein has its Being. The navigational is meaningful 
secondarily and in terms of that toward which Dasein exists. 
Archetypal regions may be concealed in everydayness as being 
irrelevant to the "important" tasks of the ready-to-hand or 
the findings of the present-at-hand; but Heidegger has
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himself shown that their decisiveness for Dasein is not 
obviated. The archetypal region, of death bears this out. 
Heideggers
Even in average everydayness, this ownmost potentiality- 
Tor^Being, which is non-relational and not to be out­
stripped , is constantly an issue for Dasein. This is 
tHe case wHen its concern is.merely in the mode of an 
untroubTed indifference towards the uttermost possi­
bility of existence.29
In this inauthentic appropriation of death which does 
not make death fully Dasein’s own, Dasein turns away from 
itself in the face of its Self. When Dasein*s non-Being is 
revealed as its own and not to be outstripped, its Being is 
made forcefully and urgently meaningful. So, most impor­
tantly, beyond the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand the 
authentic present permits an encounter with the archetypal 
image which speaks decisively for Dasein. This is "moment 
of vision" in the fullest and most proper sense in which 
Dasein moves toward seeing its Self.
Authenticity, then, is not characterized merely by a 
resoluteness and a making one's own the possibilities of 
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand involvements as Heidegger's 
analysis asserts, but most importantly it is the awareness 
and the making one’s own archetypal possibilities encountered 
"on the journey"— regions of meaning which constitute the 
final horizons of the "for the sake of which" and which 
admit to no higher functional end— thereby residing in
29Ibid., p. 299.
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themselves as encountered allowing Dasein to Be in these 
regions nearest to itself constituting its authentic Self.
Heidegger's analysis of authenticity in Being and 
Time is misleading and deficient. The final for-which and 
towards-which of Dasein is constituted in the archetypal 
regions— the intrinsically meaningful and final ground of 
Dasein*s Being. Heidegger's analysis of death (for example) 
shows dramatically and decisively the importance of arche­
typal regions, yet his basic framework of the ready-to-hand 
and present-at-hand is incapable of handling the. region of 
death as well as other archetypal regions. Death is quali­
tatively different from other ready-to-hand possibilities 
such as using doorknobs to open doors. It is different 
because it is not merely navigational but intrinsically, 
meaningful and decisive for Dasein's Self. Authenticity, 
then, should rightfully and in the end fundamentally involve 
the recognition of the intrinsically meaningful archetypal 
regions as the decisive force for Dasein; the making one's 
own of these regions and the recognition of the ready-to- 
hand and present-at-hand as Being toward and for the arche­
typal regions which ground them and grant them validity.
This analysis differs from Heidegger's in that it makes a 
third distinction in Dasein's comportment toward the world 
which could perhaps be called journeying— the ontological 
movement and comportment toward regions of archetypal sig­
nificance. And it recognizes the authenticity of all
30
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand involvements as dependent 
upon arohetypal regions. Dasein does not comport itself 
authentically merely by throwing itself into navigational 
possibilities as Heidegger seems to suggest, but can only 
comport itself authentically when it attends to archetypal 
possibilities which are intrinsically meaningful and onto- 
logically determinative.
While understanding is involved in all three ecstases 
of time, it is primarily related to the future. Under­
standing projects Dasein into its possibilities as coming 
toward its Self. Heideggers
Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily 
grasp the projected possibility thematically just by 
having it in view, but it throws itself into’it as a possibility.30
As "on the journey" Dasein is projected futurally ahead of 
itself toward regions of meaning which speak to "what 
matters." Dasein understands itself in terms of archetypal 
regions in which it is not yet but in which it in some sense 
dwells in anticipation of becoming its Self. Authentically, 
then, Dasein understands itself as open to archetypal regions 
which lie ahead of itself on the way toward death which as 
journey is always open, projected, and never fully resolved.
What follows is a brief and partial summary of The 
Epic of Gilgamesh, a four-thousand-year-old Sumerian tale of 
the journey of Gilgamesh, King of Uruk. The tale will provide
^Ibid. , p. 386.
a basis for further inquiry into journey and into regions of 
archetypal images. As the tale begins, Gilgamesh is a youth­
ful, strong king unsurpassed and unbeaten in war and in love. 
But his energies are wearing out his subjects and devastating 
the kingdom. In answer to their appeal, the gods send the 
people Enkidu, a "natural man," untamed and the equal of 
Gilgamesh. Out of their confrontation a deep and insepar­
able friendship ensues in which each is the other's half. 
Together they do battle and bring back treasures for the good 
of the kingdom. But in slaying the Bull of Heaven they anger 
the gQds and one of them must die. It is Enkidu. Gilgamesh 
is deeply grieved. He no longer feels the unconquerable 
warrior, but is stultified and defeated. He is a mortal 
like all men.
Gilgamesh undertakes a long and fearful journey into 
the .wilderness, seeking the secret of immortality. At the 
mountain of the sun at whose twin peaks are both sunrise and 
sunset he confronts and overcomes the monster guardians who 
are part man, part dragon. Gilgamesh walks through the moun­
tain of the sun twelve leagues into the absolute darkness 
retracing the journey of the sun and emerging into the garden 
of the sun which is on this side of the waters of death. The 
sun sees Gilgamesh and hearing of his quest warns him that 
he will fail. Prom the wine goddess, Siduri, a daughter of 
the sun, he receives instructions for crossing the waters of 
death. After crossing he is put to a test. He must remain
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awake if he is to have everlasting life, but in the end he
cannot keep from sleep. He is told of the plant of Youth
Regained which with great difficulty he is able to pluck
from the bottom of the sea. But immortality again slips his
grasp as a snake consumes the plant. Gilgamesh accepts his
destiny and returns home.
He was wise, he saw mysteries and knew secret things, 
he brought us a tale of the days before the flood. He 
went a long journey, was weary, worn out with labour, 
and returning engraved on a stone the whole story.31
With the death of Enkidu, Gilgamesh*s grief turns him
toward the issue of his own death.
Gilgamesh traveled over the wilderness, he wandered over 
the grasslands, a long journey, in search of Utnapish- 
tim, whom the gods took after the deluge; and they set 
him:to live in the land of Dilmun, in the garden of the 
sun; and to him alone of men they gave everlasting life.32
The region of the sun, the region of life and death, calls 
Gilgamesh to undertake the journey. It is not merely one 
among many equal possibilities of ready-to-hand and present- 
at-hand involvements which present themselves to a Dasein who 
makes ithem its own, rather it is the compelling possibility 
which calls Dasein. A traditional phenomenology of naviga­
tional possibilities could only explicate those possibili­
ties but. it could not specify the one possibility that 
mattered. Thus traditional phenomenology is ultimately
. -jiJ N; K. Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 114.
2̂Ibid., p. 94.
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ontologically silent. An archetypal approach does not level 
down Being by showing a multitude of possibilities as 
equally valid, but functions on behalf of Being to reveal 
the meaningful. Heidegger's treatment of death suggests that 
he is aware of possibilities which are intrinsically meaning­
ful, specific, and ineluctably binding; but his analysis in 
Being and Time is hampered by its attachment to the tradi­
tional phenomenological approach which empties the possibili­
ties of intrinsic meaning. Archetypal regions are ontologi­
cally directive. They are not equally arbitrary possibili­
ties and thus voided of intrinsic meaning as are the ready- 
to-hand and present-at-hand, rather they are articulate and 
specific. They direct Dasein toward its Self by indicating 
existential movements of attunement which accord Dasein with 
the world and its Self.
Initially it can be said that myth (exampled by the 
Gilgamesh Epic) functions as the metaphor of Being. The 
regions of the sun are metaphors for the regions of birth and 
death. But it is not metaphor in the sense of a contrived 
sign which is unimportant in itself and only functions to 
refer to the "real" object. Myth is a way in,which Being 
shows itself. Thus myth is of fundamental ontological impor­
tance. If Dasein functions wholly within myth, however, it 
operates unconsciously and thus inauthentically. That is, 
if Dasein is absorbed wholly in myth— in the world so to 
say— it obliterates itself and flees from a facing of itself.
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Operating along with an ontological analysis, however, myth 
is a force for Dasein’s authenticity. An ontological 
analytic provides a critical framework for the circumspective 
concern and existential awareness necessary for authenticity. 
But it must also he kept in mind that myth reveals the 
intrinsically meaningful regions which an ontological analy­
sis is toward. An ontological analytic must therefore 
finally turn to myth to show it its way.
Traditional archetypal theory has recognized the 
force and decisiveness of myth, hut in dealing with it in 
terms of a therapeutic methodology it has used it first of 
all "because it works" and pnly secondarily does it attend 
critically to the "ontological grounding" of myth. What 
traditional archetypal theory has done is to provide an open­
ing to myth and to the regions of intrinsic meaning, hut it 
tends to deal with them more as mental forces and in so doing 
covers over the world. As a rigorous arid analytical force 
it is the task of ontological inquiry to pursue the problem 
where traditional archetypal theory leaves off or falls 
short. Yet it must be remembered that archetypal theory, 
phenomenology, and existential ontology are themselves in a 
sense myths "in their own time" and as such are subject to 
further circumspective .and thematic inquiry by future myths. 
New myth must study old myth to see where it is going and in 
this way finds and is its destiny. Taken in this extended 
sense, myth is the ontological force— and the face of Being.,
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This analysis must turn again to the Gilgamesh Epic 
for further clues to its direction,, Gilgamesh says to 
Siduri, "How can I be silent, how can I rest, when Enkidu 
whom I love is dust, and I too shall die and be laid in the 
earth forever."33 Turned toward death, the journey is the 
compelling possibility for Dasein. The comfort of the they 
is compromised* No longer at home, Dasein cannot rest.
Yet the journey is forbidding. At the entrance to the moun­
tain of the sun, Gilgamesh is advised, "no mortal man has 
gone into the mountain; the length of it is twelve leagues
of darkness; in it there is no light, but the heart is
•54oppressed with darkness."-^ Unsupported by the comforting
parameters and expectations of everydayness, the journey
leads Dasein into difficult and uncertain regions which
threaten to dissolve Dasein's resoluteness and throw it again
into an inauthentic comportment which shields it from these
difficulties. Gilgamesh.replies to the advice, "Although I
should go in sorrow and in pain, with sighing and with weep-
-35.ing, still I must go. Open the gate of the mountain."-^
Firm in resoluteness, the entry is granted and engagement 
begins.
Emerging from the immense darkness, Gilgamesh enters
33Ibid. , p. 99«
3^Ibid. , p. 95 0
3^Ibid. , p. 96.
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the glorious garden of the sun. In this region he is warned 
by Shamash, the sun, that he will never find the life for 
which he is searching. Gilgamesh has turned toward the ques­
tion of death as fundamental to his Being but is unable to 
accept it as fundamentally his own. He replies to Shamash,
Now that I have toiled and strayed so far over the 
wilderness, am I to sleep, and let the earth.cover my 
head for ever? Let my eyes see the sun until they are 
dazzled with looking. Although I am no better than a 
dead man, still let me see the light of the sun.36
Gilgamesh crosses the ocean which borders the garden of the
sun and ventures still farther into the wilderness in search
of everlasting life.
The "where does Dasein go" on the journey toward 
death is wilderness. It is venture into unknown regions.
Into the wilderness the they does not venture and the way is 
not worn with the paths of everydayness. Dasein "on the 
journey" understands itself as coming toward its Self; but 
the Self it is coming towards is not yet.. Inauthentically, 
Dasein waits for ready-to-hand possibilities which it knows 
and which do not pertain to becoming its Self. Because it 
knows what approaches and comports itself in waiting only 
because it knows, it closes off possibilities which it does 
not know— possibilities which would function to effect its 
Self.
Authentically, Dasein anticipates possibilities of
36Ibid., p. 97.
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intrinsic meaning which move it toward its Self. But what 
its Self is it does not fully know, and, because under­
standing is projected ahead of itself, its Self is never 
fully resolved. Thus, in anticipating Dasein becomes reso­
lute in openness. The journey is not to a goal which is 
the journey's resolve. Authentically, the journey is appro­
priated as openness to what lies ahead on its way and an 
endlessness which though touching many regions does not take 
Dasein to a point of debarkation. As long as Dasein exists, 
that is to say as long as it is Dasein, it is "on the 
journey." Within the journey’s horizon of death, therefore, 
the journey is endless. The journey is an endlessness on its 
way.towards death. The journey, an endless openness admit­
ting to no resolution, takes Dasein into the wilderness.
The wilderness is the region of the open. The they 
turns away and recoils at the wilderness. For the they it 
is a lawless "no man’s land" (the no man which is everyone 
but no one— Heidegger's "they"). But it is a lawless "no 
man’s land" only in the sense of. the laws of everydayness; 
it is Dasein's land. The they recoils from regions in which 
everydayness is not extended, and it is not extended in the 
"lawless" wilderness. The land of the wilderness has two 
faces. It is the dark abyss where powerful forces threaten 
to destroy Dasein unprotected by the structures of everyday­
ness. Gilgamesh is threatened by the half-man, half­
scorpion monsters. Nihilism threatens Dasein unprotected by
38
the rules and laws and obligations of the everyday.
The they not only recoils from wilderness, hut, 
seeing that it is d force which rejects its rules and obli- 
gations, seeks to obliterate it. Increasingly, technology 
gives it the power it needs. That is why the they must build 
roads through and log every stretch of forest. Technology 
gives it the power to extend itself into the wilderness, to 
have a productive forest, and thus save itself from the free­
dom to be authentic which threatens it. Threatened as it is, 
the they cannot rest until it has made every stretch of 
wilderness everyone’s own— no one's own.
The other face of wilderness shows itself as the land 
of hidden treasures, sacred boon, and authentic possibili­
ties. For Gilgamesh it holds the secrets of the gods. For 
Dasein it holds the Self. The Self it holds is not the self 
apart from the world as merely in it, rather the self it 
holds is the Dasein who has entered into its regions and 
participated in its images. Dasein finds that what gives it 
its meaning and makes it its Self is found in the regions— ■ 
in the world. The world in sharing gives as possible the 
Self for Dasein to make its own. The Being of Dasein and 
the Being of the world coincide and are shared as selfsame 
in the archetypal regions. The regions of life, death, and 
journey; and the regions and path of the sun accord in show­
ing Dasein what its Self is.
The they realizes that the wilderness over which it
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now has technological power has its treasures. In fleeing 
from itself the they must avoid its autochthony and so it 
needs the wilderness for its flight. The wilderness is seen 
as holding treasures and thus gives it the excuse to flee 
from itself. , It must technologically dominate and destroy 
the wilderness which denies its "laws" and yet it must pre­
serve the wilderness so that it can flee from itself. In 
the end it attempts both and achieves neither. Recreation 
sites and trailer parks are instituted so that everybody may 
share in the recreational boon. Campsites are positioned 
for maximum utilization, and paths are cut and well marked 
so that nobody will go astray. Nothing is at issue in 
recreational facilities, and so the they makes itself safe 
from its Self by successfully preempting any possibility of 
involvement in wilderness. But neither can it fully flee 
itself for the parameters of the everyday are extended, and 
"not-at-homeness" remains to confront Dasein.
The archetypal image of wilderness accurately shows 
Dasein the "whither" of its journey. A navigational analysis 
is oblivious to the message of the wilderness. Wilderness 
is the region in which intrinsic meaning i6 radically and 
forcefully, at issue. In wilderness Dasein’s very Being is 
at stake and it is compelled to turn toward that which 
grounds it. If the.journey is toward the Self, the question 
of the existential "setting" of "beginning to achieve the 
Self" arises; that is in what existential context does Dasein
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begin to meet and be its Self? The encounter and engagement 
of archetypal regions constitutes part of the. "setting” as 
the ground of the Self. Heidegger's analysis of histori- 
cality and destiny provide further clues.
How is Dasein to understand itself as it enters into\
archetypal regions? What has it meant to other Daseins who 
have entered these regions and how have they comported them­
selves in meeting this force of their Being? Such questions 
are part of the historizing (and historicality— the onto­
logical counterpart to the historical) of Dasein. The taking 
over in resoluteness current possibilities of authentic 
existing disclosed by the historicality in which Dasein finds 
itself thrown is what Heidegger calls heritage. In this 
authentic coming back to one’s throwness as its own, "Dasein 
, hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility
■37which it has inherited and yet c h o s e n . W h a t  Heidegger 
calls fate is the awareness and the making, one's own the 
finite Being that he is. In light of Dasein's finitude and 
consequently the limited nature of its possibilities,
Dasein's possibilities gather significance and meaning 
achieves urgency and numinosity. But Dasein as fateful 
exists as Being-with-Others. The Others also historize and 
this co-historizing Heidegger calls destiny.
Heidegger:
37J Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 435.
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Destiny is not something that puts itself together 
out of individual fates, any more than Being-with- 
one-another can he, conceived as the occurring to­
gether of several Subjects. Our fates have already 
been guided in advance, in our Being with one another 
in the same world and in our resoluteness for defi­
nite possibilities.38
Destiny does not a,rise from the fates of Dasein coming to­
gether to form a sort of collective fate, rather destiny 
arises in advance of individual fates in Dasein's Being in 
the same world resolute for definite possibilities. Dasein
participates in that destiny and in the moment of vision
3 9makes it its own for "its time." In Dasein's day, its 
journey between sunrise and sunset, Dasein in an authentic 
comporting of itself attunes itself to its destiny which 
discloses regions of engagement to be in its own time. "In 
its own time" and "for its time" mean that what has been as 
specific situational involvements in time and which this 
Dasein has never been cannot be made its own, but what has 
been, Dasein is, in the sense of its destiny to be its Self 
for its time. What has been discloses regions of its des­
tiny which it may enter in its own specific situational 
involvements in its own time in its journey between its 
terminal horizons as Dasein. Heidegger:
Only in communicating and struggling does the power 
of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in 
and with its "generation" goes to make up the full
-^Ibid. , p. 436.
-^Ibid. , p. 437.
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40authentic historizing.of Dasein.
The entering into destiny in one's own time is 
achieved in the archetypal image. Without entering into 
archetypal regions, Dasein cannot fully he destined. In 
that navigational events are in themselves empty of meaning, 
there could be no reaching by Dasein into the past and into 
the future in a gathering of itself to its Self which 
embraces understandingly its Being. Heidegger says of des­
tiny, "Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our
Being with one another in the same world and in our resolute-
41ness for definite possibilities." But Dasein can only be 
fully resolute when it is resolute for something which 
grounds and gives reason for its resoluteness— the arche­
typal regions. Grounding is an ontological precondition for 
resoluteness. Heidegger's failure to distinguish between 
navigational and archetypal factors leads to the misleading 
conclusion that Dasein can be fully resolute and thus fully 
be destined for something that is in itself empty and 
ungrounded. Destiny discloses regions of archetypal signifi-L
cance. Dasein enters the regions as, they are disclosed in 
its own time and participates in and further finds its des­
tiny. Destiny further discloses destiny and does so for 
Dasein's Self in its own time. Destiny ties together and
^ I b i d .  > P* 436.
41 Ibid.
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unifies understandingly, meaningfully, the ecstases of time. 
The past as destiny gives meaningful context to what is 
engaged in the present as Being the destiny in one’s own 
time and is toward the future as regions of possible involve­
ment which are destined for Dasein in being toward its Self.
Myth shows how archetypal regions operate toward and 
in concert with destiny. Dasein in Being toward its Self 
undertakes the journey into the wilderness in search of des­
tiny. Gilgamesh ventured into the wilderness * into the 
garden of the sun, in search of everlasting life. But this 
is not the lot of man and so as Shamash had warned him his 
efforts are doomed to failure. He returns to Uruk empty 
handed— -and mortal.
But in failing to achieve immortality, he succeeds 
in entering into his destiny. He does not merely strive in 
vain only to be beaten back into a state which he should 
have realized beforehand. Rather he has journeyed deeply 
into the wilderness and entered the regions of his destiny. 
His ’'failure" has enabled him to make his destiny his own, 
not superficially and from afar, but emphatically in its 
nearness. Thus, the journey itself acts on behalf of des­
tiny and leads Dasein to its Self— its destiny not wholly 
dependent upon the path or goal set forth beforehand by a 
less authentic Dasein on the way toward its Self.
Destiny permeates present-at-hand and ready-to-hand 
involvements, yet the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand
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do not constitute destinies nor even possibilities for a 
destiny "in one’s own time" except in,a trivial or dependent 
sense. The journey is a ready-to-hand possibility but it 
can be toward destiny only because it is more than merely 
ready-to-hand. The journey is an image which bears the 
meaning of destiny and infuses the navigational factors—  
the ready-to-hand involvements of the journey— with a sig­
nificance which Dasein is able to enter understandingly and 
with a level of decisiveness made possible by the depth of 
what is at stake— the way in which Dasein is to be in the 
world.
On the journey, Gilgamesh is asked by Urshanabi,
Why are your cheeks so starved and your face drawn?
Why is despair in your heart and your face like the 
face of one who has made a long journey; yes, why is 
your face burned with heat and cold, and why do you 
come wandering over the pastures in search of thewind?42
The climax of the question, Gilgamesh's wandering in search 
of the wind, is two-edged. One edge penetrates the folly. 
Gilgamesh has made a long journey in search of everlasting 
life, a destiny that is not his and cannot be. He has under­
taken a tortuous journey for nothing. His quest is as foolish 
as searching for wind. When wind is grasped and contained, 
it ceases to be wind. It does not fall into the ready-to- 
hand or hold itself for the present-at-hand. And this points 
toward the other edge. The plant of youth must inevitably
42Sandars, trans. , The Epic of' Gilgamesh, p. 100.
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slip the grasp of Gilgamesh. It is not everlasting life 
which authentically calls him; it is the destiny of the 
region, the destiny which so to speak blows through the 
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand of the region and infuses 
it with meaning. By entering the archetypal regions, 
Gilgamesh so to say breathes his destiny. As authentic he 
is embraced by destiny in his time and breathes the breath 
of destiny— the: infusing wind of the regions, his ontologi­
cal sustenance.
The journey is one of homecoming. It is homecoming 
in two aspects. Heidegger provides the basis for the 
analysis:
This character of Being-in was then brought to view 
more concretely in the everyday publicness of the 
"they,” which brings tranquillized self-assurance—  
"Being-at-home," with all its obviousness— into the 
average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand, 
as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it. back from its 
absorption in the "world." Everyday familiarity col­
lapses. Dasein has been individualized, but indivi­
dualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters 
into the existential "mode" of the "not-at-home."43
In the everydayness of the they, Dasein functions 
inauthentically as separated from its destiny. It is "not- 
at-home." Through anxiety and being turned towards death, 
Dasein recognizes it as "not-at-home." In everydayness dis­
persed into the they, Dasein thinks itself at home. But it 
is only in the recognition of "not-Being-at-home" that 
Dasein is able to come home, is able to turn toward its Self
^Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 233.
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and undertake the journey of homecoming which leads it into
the regions of its destiny, where Dasein can Be what its
Self is, residing in what grounds, shelters, and sustains
it— its ontological, thus authentic, home.
The. second aspect of homecoming is the "telling of
the story." Heidegger:
Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our 
Being with one another in the same world and in our 
resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in com­
municating and in struggling does the power of destiny 
become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 
"generation" goes to make up the full authentic his- 
torizing of Dasein.44
In the "telling of the story," the power of destiny becomes
free and Dasein is able to have fully a destiny for its
time. Part of Dasein's destiny is to have it with others.
The Gilgamesh Epic tells us that Gilgamesh "was wise, he saw
mysteries and saw secret things, he brought us a tale of the
days before the flood. He went a long journey, was weary,
worn out with labour, and returning engraved on a stone the 
45whole story."
At this point it may be helpful to turn briefly to a 
later writing of Heidegger's which illustrates the continuity 
of archetypal themes which make possible a destiny in one's 
own time. The essay "Remembrance of the Poet" concerns it­
self with Holderlin's poem "Homecoming." Heidegger comments:
^ I b i d . , p. 436.
45Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 114.
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Homecoming is the return into the proximity of the 
source. But such a return is only possible for one 
who has previously, and perhaps for a long time now, 
borne on his shoulders as the wanderer the burden of 
the voyage, and has gone over into the source, so 
that he could there experience what the nature of the 
Sought-For might be, and then be able to come back 
more experienced as the Seeker.46
The Seeker is the one who has heard the call of the source
and has undertaken the journey which grants him entry in the
regions of what is most near. Heidegger attends to the
•s
second aspect of homecoming when he.says "The elegy ’Home-
coming' is not a poem about homecoming; rather the elegy
itself, taken as the very poetry of which it is comprised,
is the actual homecoming."47 The bearing of the message to
those of his homeland in a sharing of destiny fulfills the
destiny of the Seeker. Heidegger further relates "The ’not'
is the mysterious call 'to' the others in the fatherland, to
become hearers, in order that for the first time they should
4.8learn to know the essence of the homeland." This commen­
tary applies also to the lines of the Gilgamesh Epic which 
are in lament of his death: "As in the dark month, the month
of shadows, so without him there is no light. 0 Gilgamesh,
49this was the meaning of your dream." The Seeker in the
^Martin Heidegger, Remembrance of the Poet, trans. by 
Douglas Scott, in Existence and Being, pp. 258-259.
47Ibid. , p. 261.
4^Ibid., pp. 266-267.
49Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 115*
region of his day brings light to the people of the homeland 
such that they may learn to know the essence of their dwell­
ing. Authentically, Dasein has its Being towards archetypal 
regions of the world which show it its Self and make it fully 
destined for its time. Without (that is outside of a dwell­
ing in) archetypal regions, Dasein is groundless and,self- 
annihilating having its fragmented ’'Da-Sein” in the space 
between its horizons of birth and death..
CHAPTER III
SUMMARY
This paper has attempted to show the inadequacy of 
an ontological approach which merely explicates naviga­
tional possibilities and the necessity of turning toward 
something like an archetypal approach which is cognizant 
of ontological regions of intrinsic meaning which are 
specific, articulate, and directive forces functioning to 
ground Dasein in its Self. Heidegger's approach in Being 
and Time is largely navigational and yet its most important 
aspects point dramatically to something beyond a merely 
navigational approach— a pointing which Heidegger heeds in 
his later writings. The images of myth, art, and the 
"world itself" indicate the regions of issue. Jung has 
dealt systematically with these regions in terms of a thera­
peutic methodology and in doing so has laid much of the 
groundwork for dealing with them. What is needed is a 
broader, less limited inquiry which is not bound only to 
"therapy." The task of this paper has been threefold! to 
show the importance of archetypal inquiry for the philo­
sophic tradition, to precision the area of that inquiry in 
terms of an existential analytic and simultaneously clarify 
the direction of the existential analytic itself, and to
49
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initiate an inquiry into archetypal regions which would be 
broader than a merely therapeutic approach.
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